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Mitchell Mclnnes*

The Question of a Duty
To Rescue in Canadian
Tort Law: An Answer
From France

I. Introduction
"Am I my brother'skeeper?"'
2
A man witnesses a canoeist drowning a short distance from the shore.
For over forty minutes the tenants of an apartment complex listen to the
tortured screams of a woman being murdered in the streets below.3 A
handful of railway employees watch a boy bleed to death for want of
medical attention after he was struck by a passing car. 4 The owner of a
pleasure craft learns that one of his passengers has fallen overboard into
an icy lake.' An innocent party to a motor vehicle accident finds that the
driver at fault was injured as a result of the mishap. 6 In each of these
examples the first mentioned party (or parties) could have safely rendered
assistance to the helpless victim. The aim of the present discussion is to
show that there ought to be a legal obligation to do so in Canadian tort
law.
At present, there is no such obligation. While it has been said that the
genius of the common law lies in its ability to move with the times, with
respect to the recognition of a duty to rescue those in peril, it appears that
it has been singularly uninspired. Reflective of the prevailing societal
morals and values when first pronounced six hundred years ago, the
denial of general duty7 today seems anachronistic, incongruous and
*Mitchell Mclnnes, Reynolds Mirth Richards and Farmer, Edmonton, Alberta. This article is
based on a thesis paper written at Trinity Hall, Cambridge under the helpful supervision of Mr.
Richard Fentiman in partial satisfaction of the LL.M. requirements of Cambridge University.
The author acknowledges the insightful comments contributed by Mr. Brett Mason and Mr.
Ian O'Donnell. Any errors, however, are attributable to the author alone.
1. Genesis, 4:9.
2. Osterlindv. Hill (1928), 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301.
3. These were the facts surrounding the murder of Kitty Genovese in New York City, March
26, 1964. Discussed infra n. 184.
4. Union PacificR.R. v. Cappier(1903), 66 Kan. 649,72 P. 281.
5. Horsley v. McLaren [1972] S.C.R. 441, 22 D.L.R. (3d) 545; affg. [1970] 2 O.R. 487, 11
D.L.R. (3d) 277; revg. [196912 O.R. 137,4 D.L.R. (3d) 557.
6. See ag. Alberta Motor Vehicle Administration Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. M-22, s.76 (1).
7. There is actually a dearth of decisions the ratio decidendiof which stands for the proposition
that there is no general duty to rescue at common law. One frequently cited American case
which is on point seems today to have been wrongly decided: Osterlind v. Hill supra n. 2,
discussed infra at n. 110. There is,however, no similar shortage of dicta on the matter (see e.g.
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unduly harsh. Encouragingly, the past century has witnessed a clearly
discernible trend among the judiciary and the legislatures of Canada
towards imposing civil (as well as criminal) liability in an increasing
number of situations which previously would have yielded a hands-off
response. Nevertheless, for the most part the law has remained stubbornly
loyal to the past. Courts, handcuffed by history and compelled by
precedent, have at times felt powerless to do more than express personal
dismay at callous refusals to observe the most basic of humanitarian
obligations. Unless the facts of a case fall within the rather narrowly
prescribed scope of one of the recognized exceptions, tradition dictates
that liability will not follow upon a refusal to rescue. The defendant's
wrong in most cases consists only in the refusal to confer a gratuitous
benefit, and with omissions the law generally does not concern itself.
There are, of course, those who oppose the imposition of a general
duty to rescue. In support of their position they might argue that pro-duty
advocates are bound by the confines of conjecture insofar as the common
law has never required rescue. There is, however, a path out of the ivory
towers of academic speculation - in many jurisdictions, tort law does
insist on assistance. In addition to two American states8 and many other
civil law countries, 9 France has legislation which allows for liability
where there has been a failure to attempt to rescue one in peril. 10 The
French experience in the past forty-eight years seems proof positive that
a workable formula is possible, and that the administrative and
philosophical nightmares predicted by opponents of the duty are quite
likely unfounded. Consequently, it will be argued that the French law
provides an appropriate model which Canadian law should follow. It
should be noted at the outset, though, that it is not the aim of this paper
to present a comprehensive comparative survey of civil liability for
Horsley v. McLaren. supra n. 5). At any rate, it seems that the proposition is widely accepted
and well entrenched in the minds of Canadian tort lawyers (see eg. Rainaldi, Remedies in Tort
(1987) 16.1-96, para. 141; Linden, Canadian Tort Law (3d) 301) and for the sake of
convenience the situations in which a duty has definitely been recognized will be referred to
as "exceptions". This nomenclature does not affect the analysis.
8. Vermont, YT. STAT. ANN.tit. 12, para. 519 (Equity 1973 & 1983 Supp.); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. para. 604.05 (West 1983 Supp.).

9. See Rudzinski, "The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis" in The Good Samaritan
and the Law (J. Ratcliffe ed., 1966) 91; Feldbrugge, "Good and Bad Samaritans: A

Comparative Survey of Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue" (1966), 14
Amer. J. of Comp. Law 655; Note "The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Survey" (1952),
52 Colum. L Rev. 631; DeKuiper, "Stalking the Good Samaritan: Communists, Capitalists
and the Duty to Rescue" (1976), 3 Utah L Rev. 529. The countries which have enacted
legislation requiring rescue include: Belgium (Code Penal, art. 422), West Germany (German
Draft Penal Code, art. 232), Greece (Greek Penal Code, art. 307), Italy (Italian Penal Code,
art. 583) and Poland (Penal Code of the Polish People's Republic, art. 144).

10. 1988-89 Code Pnal.
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nonfeasance in the two countries. Rather, the purpose of examining the
French law is to show that there are not any compelling reasons why a
duty should not be imposed. Other arguments will be made to show why
a duty should be imposed.
The potential scope of an examination of a duty to rescue is daunting
because of the broad definition which can be applied to the term
"rescue". For present purposes, however, its meaning will be somewhat
restricted. The type of situations in question will become clearer when a
proposed formula for a duty is discussed" and as the paper progresses.
For now, a few comments will suffice. A rescue situation is one in which
the person in peril is in imminent danger of (further) personal injury
which is of a serious nature, or of death. The cause of the peril must be
a single act or circumstance, or a set of acts or circumstances which are
very closely joined in time. The source of the danger may be natural or
man-made. That the victim may be the author of his own misfortune is
irrelevant.
The discussion which follows has been divided into six parts. In the
first (Chapter II), the context of the rescue question will be set. The
traditional common law position will be outlined and the history of the
duty in French law will be traced. In Chapter III, article 63§2 of the
French Code Penal will be examined and a formula for a Canadian duty
will be proposed. Chapter IV will deal at length with the law in Canada
as it stands today - the denial of a general duty and the existence of
various exceptions. Some time will be spent on an examination of the
attempts of several authors to provide a common explanation for all of
the exceptions. While perhaps superficially attractive, it will be shown
that such theories are inadequate and misleading. The issue is at bottom
one of policy and should be treated as such. Chapter V will further
develop this idea by examining generally the role of policy in tort law. In
Chapter VI various policy arguments, pro and con, will be scrutinized
under the light of the French experience. It will be shown that for a
Canadian society moving into the 1990's there is little to discourage and
much to recommend the imposition of a general duty to rescue. Finally,
the various thoughts, concerns and ideas presented throughout the paper
will be drawn together by way of conclusion in Chapter VII.
II. History of Duty to Act at Common Law and in French Law
It has been said that the anomalous situations in which the common law
12
will impose liability for an omission are abnormal and disturbing.
11. Infra%Chapter III.
12. Bohlen, "The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability" (1908), 56
U.PaLRev. 217 and 316, at 221,226.
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Indeed, if the structure of the law was to be re-cast it might well be more
logical, as Bohlen suggested,1 3 to restrict the scope of tort law to cases of
active misconduct and to classify all affirmative duties, whether
contractual in nature or not, as an area unto itself. The law, however, is
as it is. The explanation for its present state is found in the historical
development of the remedies available at common law. A detailed
analysis of that development would benefit the present discussion very
little. (For those interested, however, the area has been canvassed in
many excellent works.1 4) Suffice it to say for now that the common law
has traditionally been most reluctant to require rescue.
1. History ofDuty to Act in French Law
Before 1941 the law in France was much the same as it was in the
common law world - generally speaking, legal sanctions would not
follow upon a refusal to rescue someone.' 5 An omission could, of course,
give rise to liability if it amounted to a breach of a contractual term
(whether express or implied by custom). 6 In criminal law the general
rule was unqualified. 17 In tort law there were few exceptions to the
general rule.' 8 Nonfeasance was actionable only in regards to one upon
whom the law imposed an affirmative obligation (e.g. landowners,
manufacturers, and those who controlled dangerous persons or
chattels). 19 As in common law countries, the result was a series of
decisions which, while shocking to the moral sensibilities of the
community, were nevertheless legally sound. 20 How long such a state of
affairs would have been permitted to continue under normal conditions
13. d at 226.
14. See eg. Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law (1949); Holmes, The Common
Law; McNeice and Thornton, "Affirmative Duties in Tort" (1949), 58 Yale LJ 1272.
15. Tunc, "The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan" in The Good Samaritan and the Law,
supra n. 9 at 43. The reasons for the denial of a duty were similar to those cited by English
courts (eg. the law was already occupied by wrongful acts, emphasis on individual liberties),
see Lawson and Markesinis, Tortious Liabilityfor UnintentionalHarm in the Common Law
andthe Civil Law vol. 1 (1982) 52. Discussed infra chapter VI.
16. Tunc, Abstention Delictueuse para. 29 [1947] Dalloz Nouveau Repetoire 8.
17. 'Affaire Monnier, Cour d'Appel Portiers, 20 nov. 1901, [1901] Da~loz Jurisprudence, II.
85; Tunc, Id, para. 2.
18. While dicta from a 1924 decision of the Cour da Cassation hints at a broad scope of
liability for omissions, commentators suggest that the law remained unaltered and mere moral
duties would not give rise to a tort action. Tunc, "The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan",
supra n. 9 at 49.
19. Tunc, "Abstention Delictueuse", supra n. 16 at para. 30-33; "The Failure to Rescue: A
Comparative Study", supran.9 at 639.
20. Reynaud, "Omission de Secours en Droit Penal" (1945); H. et L. Mazeaud et Tunc, Traite
Theoretique et Pratiquede la Responsibilitie Civille Delictuelle et Contractuele,5th ed., Vol.
1, 1957, No. 526.
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is unknown. While an increasing number of European countries had
come to impose a positive obligation to render aid,2' remarkable and
unfortunate circumstances provided French legislators with a unique
impetus.
In 1941 a German officer serving in France was murdered while
witnesses stood idly by, refusing to intervene. By way of reprisal the Nazis
executed 50 hostages. The Vichy government, coerced by the Germans,
hoped to obviate the future need for such drastic measures by providing
a means of redress through the more humane channels of the French
courts. 22 The result was the enactment of a statute which required
intervention for the prevention of crimes and for the assistance of persons
in peril.2 3 While libertarians opposed to the imposition of this duty can
point to the fact that it first arose in France under the pressure of a fascist
regime, subsequent events removed that stain. Although the original
statute was repealed after the liberation, it is clear that the purpose of
doing so was to facilitate improvements. A free French government,
declaring the law void, sought not to repudiate the existence of the duty,
but rather to retain it in an expanded form. The year 1945 saw the
implementation of articles 61-63 of the Penal Code,24 of which article
63§2 is, for the present purposes, the most pertinent. It provides that:2 5
Whoever abstains voluntarily from giving such aid to a person that he
would have been able to give him without risk to himself or third persons
by his personal action or by calling help...
shall be liable.
The statute is primarily penal in nature, the criminal punishment for a
breach being a term of imprisonment of between three months and five
years, or a fine of between 36,000 and 1,500,000 francs, or both. Of
more relevance for the present purposes, of course, is the fact that a
breach can also give rise to civil liability. Typically, the claim can be dealt
with as part of the criminal action, the victim appearing as partie civile.

21. Portugal (1867), Switzerland (1808), Netherlands (1881), Italy (1889), Norway (1902),
Russia (1903), Turkey (1926), Denmark (1930), Poland (1932), Germany (1871, 1935).
Rudzinski's seminal survey, "The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis" in The Good
Samaritanandthe Law, supra n. 9 at 91, should be consulted for a detailed discussion.
22. Magnol [1946] Semaine Juridique 1.531.
23. Tunc, Commentaire [1946] Dalloz Legislation 33, 38.
24. [1947] Dalloz Legislation 130. The most significant difference between the two versions
is that the later one does not require proof that serious bodily harm or death actually resulted
from the failure to give succour.
25. Sera puni des memes pienes quiconque s'abstient volontairement de porter a une personne
en peril l'assistance que sans risque pour lui ni pur tiers, il pouvait lui preter, soit par son action
personelle, soit en provoquant un secours.
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Thus, a father-in-law who refused to lend a helping hand to his drowning
son-in-law was not only incarcerated for three years, but was also
26
ordered to pay 250,000 francs in civil damages.
III.

27

Article 63§2 of the FrenchPenalCode and a ProposedDuty

Professor Tunc has distilled from the statute and related case law four
conditions which must be met before liability can be incurred. 28 First, the
person must be in danger. Unlike the situation in other jurisdictions, the
29
duty is not, however, dependant upon the victim's life being in danger.
It is enough that there is a serious threat to bodily integrity and health. 0
Interestingly, the statute is breached even where death would inevitably
have occurred regardless of whether or not aid was given, 3' although it is
otherwise if the person is already dead. Second, the statute is breached
only where something could have been done, though that "something" is
not exhausted by possibilities of personal intervention. Depending on the
circumstances, obtaining help from others may be required in lieu of, or
in addition to, actual physical involvement. 32 Third, one is required to act
only in the absence of risk to himself or third parties. Significantly,
however, mere inconvenience is not sufficient to excuse action,33 nor is
risk to property. 34 Finally, the refusal to rescue must be voluntary. It will
not be so where one is unaware of the need for assistance. Unlike the
duties imposed elsewhere, however, in France one need not be an actual
witness at the scene to be under an obligation. It is enough to be "reliably
informed" of the circumstances. Thus, physicians have been found liable
for failing to make a house call on a patient who was in danger of dying. 35

26. Trib. corr. d'Aix 27 mars 1947, D. 1947. 304.
27. During the course of research, it was found that the literature concerning art. 63§2 was
based largely on older cases. The annotated Code Pnal (86th ed., 1988-89, pp. 49-51) is
illustrative of this fact.
28. Tunc, "The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan" in The Good Samaritan and the Law,
supra n. 9 at 47.
29. Such a requirement is found in Norway, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the
Netherlands. Rudzinski "The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis" in The Good
Samaritanand the Law, id at 96.
30. Crim. 31 mai 1949, D. 1949. 347; 21 janv. 1954, D. 1954. 224; 17 dec. 1959, D. 1960.
398.
31. Crim. 23 mars 1953, D. 1953. 371; Trib. corr. Belley, 22 Oct. 1953, D. 1953. 711.
32. Crim. 26 juill. 1954. D. 1954. 666; Trib. corr. Bayeux 22 juin 1954, D. 1954. 603.
33. "The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan" in The Good Samaritan and the Law, supra n.
9 at 48.
34. Rouen, 31 mars 1949, D. 1950. Somm. 9; Crim. 30 dec. 1953, D. 1954. 333; Comp. Trib.
corr. Orlans, 29 nov. 1950, D. 1951. 246, note de M. Tunc; Trib. corr, d'Aix 27 mars 1947,
D. 1947. 304.
35. Crim. 31 mai 1949, D. 1949. 347.
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The French statute provides a sensible, comprehensive model for the
duty which should be imposed in Canada. First of all, the policy
underlying a duty to rescue would not be well served if an obligation
existed only where the victim's life was in danger. The call for
humanitarian behaviour is as real, and nearly as strong, when serious
injury is threatened as when life is threatened. It would be most arbitrary
and callous to turn a blind eye where, for example, mangled limbs would
follow from a refusal to give aid if civil liability was possible where death
would follow. Further, while there will be instances where the gravity of
the situation will be readily apparent, it would seem to invite problems
to restrict the imposition of a duty to such cases. For that reason, the
French law is probably also wise to not encourage speculation as to
whether or not death is inevitable.3 6 Even for those trained in emergency
medical procedures, the frenzied circumstances in which a call for help is
likely to arise do not portend accurate prognostications. The French
statute should also be followed insofar as it does not require the rescue of
property which is at risk. Whereas the imposition of a duty is justified
where a person is facing danger, it may not be where a thing is facing
danger.
A prime concern of any legal system is the protection of certain things
(tangible or not) which are of value to human beings. Not all these things
can have the same value; nor can they always be given efficient protection
against all invasions. A hierarchy is thus dictated by moral, economic, and
other considerations with37the result that the law affords better protection
to the better things in life.
On whom should a duty be imposed? Again, the French legislation
gives an appropriate response, congruent with the policy of a duty. Some
have suggested that only those actually witness to the peril should be
obliged to act.38 It is not at all clear, however, why a duty should be so
dependant on chance. If a witness who is physically incapable of
undertaking a rescue himself calls over his hedge to his neighbour and
explains the situation, why should the neighbour not be similarly required
to help? Of course, the line must be drawn at some point - but it is a
point which French courts have been able to locate. Thus, a duty should
be imposed on one who is either present at the scene or who is "reliably
informed". The "reasonable man" standard should be used in deciding
36. Supra n. 30.
37. Lawson and Markesinis, Tortious Liability for UnintentionalHarm in the Common Law
andthe Civil Law, supra n. 15 at 49.
38. See e.g. Rudzinski, "The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis" in The Good
Samaritanand the Law, supra n. 9 at 123. He notes that this is the position in some European
countries.

92 The Dalhousie Law Journal

whether a person so informed assessed the circumstances and the need for
help properly. However, even if it would otherwise be imposed, a duty
may be negated by the circumstances. It would be futile to cast the
standard excessively high. A strong, intractable, self-preservationist streak
runs through most, a fact which simply can not be denied. Therefore, a
bystander should not be obliged to injure himself in an attempt to assist
others. (Of course, given the goal being pursued, it should not be open to
him to employ methods which would imperil third parties.) The more
difficult issue concerns the degree of danger which should justify
passivity. It has been suggested that an arithmetic analysis should be used,
and that inaction should be excused where "the effort, risk or cost of
acting is disproportionately less than the harm or damage avoided. '39
This, however, is not an advisable approach as it would once again
require an unrealistically sophisticated appraisal of the circumstances.
Although it might be hoped that the possibility of some measure of
personal sacrifice would be assumed, the French law is probably realistic
in imposing a duty only where it can be satisfied without risk. Neither the
call of conscience nor the threat of legal liability can compel most people
to knowingly endanger themselves.
Depending on the nature of the situational demands, the requirement
under French law is to personally intervene, or obtain help, or both. This
is sensible. The spirit of the duty would not be observed if one could walk
away simply because personal involvement was impossible if others, who
could help, were summonable. Whatever action is called for, however,
the rescuer should not be expected to satisfy too high a standard of care.
Beggars can not be choosers, and it must be remembered that the victim
40
is getting something for nothing. In contrast to the early common law,
French law has been appropriately forgiving of those who mishandle
rescue attempts. The emotions and anxiety experienced during times of
crises are accounted for, and resulting errors are usually excused. 41 The
statutory protection from civil suits which is granted to doctors and
nurses in Canada today42 should be extended to all rescuers. This would
encourage Good Samaritanism by denying liability for mishandled efforts
except where the complained of conduct amounted to "gross negligence".

39. Rudolph, "The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule" (1965), 44 Neb. L Rev. 409 at 509.
40. See eg. Anderson v. Northern Ry Co. (1875), 25 U.C.C.P. 301 (C.A.); Kimball v. Butler
Bros. (1910), 15 O.W.R. 221 (C.A.).

41. For further discussion, see Tunc, "The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan" in The Good
Samaritanand the Law, supra n. 9 at 50-51.
42. See e.g. Emergency Medical Aid Act R.S.A. 1980, c. E-9, s.2. For further discussion, see
infra at n. 86.
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IV. CurrentLaw: GeneralAbsence ofDuty andExceptions
Common law courts have long felt uncomfortable with the law's general
denial of a duty to assist one in peril. When first articulated centuries ago
this general principle, reflective of the prevailing values, was accepted
without discomfort. As the societal ethos of rugged individualism
gradually gave way to a more collectivist spirit, however, judgments
denying liability increasingly came to the accompanied by statements of
apology and sympathy. 43 Unsuccessful plaintiffs were commonly
comforted with the assurance that while their alleged tortfeasors had
evaded legal condemnation, judgement of another sort would eventually
right any wrongs. 44
With the humane side of the question courts are not concerned. It is the
omission or negligent discharge of legal duties only which come within the
sphere of judicial cognizance. For withholding relief from the suffering, for
failure to respond to the calls of worthy charity, or for faltering in the
bestowment of brotherly love on the unfortunate, penalties are found not
in the laws of men, but in that higher law, the violation of which is
condemned by the voice of conscience, whose sentence of punishment for
the recreant act is swift and sure.
Inevitably, time began to see the crystallization of conscience into law as
the number of "exceptional" situations in which a duty would be
imposed grew even larger. Today liability for a failure to act will lie in
widely disparate circumstances, many of which would not have been
actionable under the traditional common law position. A striking
example of this can be seen in regards to the position of ship operators
who fail to come to the aid of passengers who have fallen overboard. In
1913 the Appellate Division of the Ontario Supreme Court, noting the
lack of precedents which could support the imposition of a duty,
dismissed a passenger's action. 4 Six decades later the Supreme Court of
Canada in Horsley v. McLaren expressly held that the earlier decision
was no longer good law.4
1. Exceptions to the GeneralRule

47

43. See eg. Soulsby v. City of Toronto (1907), 15 O.L.R. 13, 18; Buch v. Armory Mfg. Co.

(1898), 69 N.H. 257, 44A. 809, 810; Yania v. Bigan (1959), 397 Pa. 316, 332, 155A. 2d 343,
346.
44. Union PacificRy. v. Cappier(1930), 66 Kan. 649 at 658. Of course, as Prosser notes, such
remedies are in a "wicked world singularly ineffective either to prevent harm or compensate
the victim." Law of Torts (1964) 336.
45. Vanvalkenberg v. Northern Navigation Co. (1913), 30 O.L.R. 142, 19 D.L.R. 649.
46. [1972] S.C.R. 441,22 D.L.R. (3d) 545,546,549.
47. As will become clear many of these "exceptions" do not fit squarely within the concept
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(i) RelationshipsofEconomic Benefit
The Supreme Court of Canada has on a number of occasions recognized
that a duty may arise where a relationship of economic benefit exists. In
Jordan House Ltd v. Menow,4 8 Mr. Justice Laskin (as he then was)
agreed with the lower court's decision to impose liability upon a hotel
which had served beer to a patron who was past the point of visible
intoxication and later ejected him out into the night. The action was
brought by the patron after he was struck by a vehicle as he weaved his
way down a much-traveled highway on foot. It was held that while
motorists might be expected to succumb to Good Samaritan impulses
and take steps to ensure that the plaintiff safely reached his destination,
they were under no legal duty to do so. The hotel, on the other hand, was
under such a duty. The basis for the difference seems primarily to have
been that the hotel stood in an invitor-invitee relationship with its patron,
although, significantly, it was stressed that "a great deal turned on the
knowledge of the [hotel] of the patron and his conditions ... .,,49 Not
every tavern-owner would be obliged to "act as a watch dog for all
patrons who enter his place of business and drink to excess." 50 The
litigants in the JordanHouse case were particularly well acquainted, and
the plaintiffs propensity to over-consumption and subsequent reckless
behaviour was well known to the defendant. Indeed, the defendant had
earlier ordered its employees not to serve the plaintiff unless he was
accompanied by a responsible person. 5'
The recent decision in Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd52
once again found the Supreme Court of Canada imposing a duty of
positive action largely on the basis of an economic relationship.
of "rescue" as it was earlier defined. What is sometimes required are preventative measures.
They are nevertheless included because they represent instances in which the law imposes an
obligation of affirmative action, the aim of which is to assist another. That such instances are
very similar in nature to "pure rescue" situations is obvious.
What follows is intended to be more illustrative that exhaustive. Regrettably, some areas
(e.g. responsibilities of occupiers' of land, governmental liability) had to be left out because of
limitations on the length of this paper. The omission of other areas (e.g. those concerning
financial loss, as opposed in physical injury; see e.g. Monash v. Lockhart and Ritchie Ltd
(1978), 24 N.B.R. (2d) 180, 95 D.L.R. (3d) 647 caused less anxiety. Fortunately, these
sacrifices will not affect the strength of the argument which follows.
48. [1974] S.C.R. 239, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 105; affg. [1971] 1 O.R. 129,14 D.L.R. (3d) 345; affg.
[1970] 1 O.R. 54, 7 D.L.R. (3d) 494.
49. Id at 113. Mr. Justice Ritchie, concurring on the result based his decision on narrower
grounds. For him the duty imposed was simply to not serve the plaintiff alcohol when he was
drunk.
50. Id at 113.
51. Id at 107.
52. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1186, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 44 C.C.L.T. 225; revg. (1985), 20 D.L.R.
(4th) 552, 33 C.C.L.T. 73; which revd (1983), 150 D.L.R. (3d) 478, 25 C.C.L.T. 201.
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The defendant, a ski resort operator, in an effort to promote its
facilities and improve its financial future, held a "tubing" race in which
participants slid down a steep, mogulled hill on inner tubes. The plaintiff
and a friend entered the competition and paid a $15.00 entry fee in the
hopes of winning the $200.00 offered in prize money. The morning
before the first race was marked by heavy drinking as Crocker imbibed
various alcoholic beverages, some of which he had brought with him and
some of which he had purchased from the defendant. Between the first
round of competition, in which Crocker and his team-mate were
victorious, and the second round, the plaintiff persisted in drinking and
became increasingly intoxicated. The owner of the resort, Beals, noticed
Crocker's severely impaired condition and asked the plaintiff if he was fit
to continue on in the competition. Receiving an answer in the affirmative,
Beals dropped the matter. Durno, the resort's manager, was also alarmed
by the situation and suggested to Crocker that he not participate in the
second heat. The suggestion was ignored and no further efforts were
made to dissuade the plaintiff. During the race Crocker hit a mogul, was
tossed from his tube and injured his neck. The result was quadriplegia.
Madam Justice Wilson, delivering the Court's unanimous opinion,
overturned the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal and found that
the defendant did owe an obligation to Crocker. Her Ladyship focussed
on. the line of reasoning used in Jordan House, its precursors and
progeny, and held that "when a ski resort establishes a competition in a
highly dangerous sport and runs the competitionfor profit, it owes a duty
of care towards visibly intoxicated participants. ' 53 It is one thing to
encourage or permit sober competitors to race. It is another matter
entirely to allow drunken individuals who are incapable of properly
slowing or steering their tube with their feet to do the same. Wilson J.
also found that the duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent the
plaintiff from participating was not met by the defendant's rather tepid
efforts. In the end the trial judge's apportionment of fault was adopted,
the plaintiff was held to be 25% contributorily negligent and a new trial
was ordered to assess the quantum of damages for which the defendant
was liable.
In Arnold v. Teno54 a four-and-a-half year old infant plaintiff was
successful in an action against the driver and owner of an ice cream
vending truck. After making a purchase the child happily dashed into the
street with her treat. Upon doing so she was struck by a vehicle. The
53. Id at 1198 e (emphasis added). The element of economic benefit is emphasized elsewhere
in the judgment at 1197f, 1197h and 1204.
54. (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 609, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287, 3 C.C.L.T. 272; affg. but varying 67
D.L.R. (3d) 9, 11 O.R. (2d) 585; which affd 7 O.R. (2d) 276.
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Supreme Court of Canada found the driver of the vending truck guilty of
negligence based on his failure to warn his young customer of the
oncoming traffic, the presence of which would have been readily
apparent had he exercised the slightest precaution and glanced out a
window at the rear of his vehicle. A duty to take such precautions arose
as soon as the defendants put the ice cream truck into operation. At that
moment,55
...
they put themselves in such a relationship with their child patrons that
they became the neighbour to those children and in the words of Lord
Atkin, "must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you
can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour."
Mr. Justice Spence noted that the truck, its appearance, and the products
and their appearance were all carefully designed to attract child
customers. The quid pro quo of carrying on the business of selling ice
cream in such a manner was the requirement of ensuring that it was done
with "ordinary regard for the safety of others". 56 If the cost of fulfilling
such a requirement (e.g. by manning each truck with two attendants
instead of one) was economically prohibitive, "then the company should
not have been carrying on the business .... ,,57
(ii) Relationshipsof Controlor Supervision
Individuals often stand in a relationship of control or supervision in
which one is dominant over the other. In some instances the price
consequent on that power is the obligation to protect the subordinate
party from harm. In Teno v. Arnold the driver and owner of the ice
cream truck claimed a contribution from the infant plaintiff's mother on
the basis that she had failed in her duty to protect her daughter from
harm. While denying that there had been any such breach," Spence J.
did confirm the lower court's finding that a duty did exist, citing with
approval5 9 the decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in
McCallion v. Dodd6
A stranger would render himself liable in negligence only if he had on a
particular occasion assumed or accepted the care and charge of the child.
It seems to me, however, that parents are in a somewhat different
55. (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 609,617 (per Spence J.).

56. Id
57. Id The court was not unanimous on this point. "The law does not impose a duty to take

all safety precautions". Idat 643 (per Pigeon J.).
58. Id at 625 (De Grandpr6, J. dissenting in part).
59. Id at 623.
60. [1966] N.Z.L.R. 710,721 (per North, P.). See also Canadian Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-46, s. 215 (1) (duty tending to preservation of the lives of dependents).
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position.... I do not consider that a parent while present is ever able to
shed responsibility for the child's safety....

Similarly, in an employer-employee relationship where the former may
dictate working conditions, a duty exists. 61 An obligation has also been
recognized as between school and pupil,62 innkeeper and guest, 63 ship
65
master and passenger, 64 jail and prisoner, and hospital and patient.66
Frequently a relationship of control or supervision may give rise to a
duty which is owed not to the party under control, but rather to a third
party. Thus, a parent owes a duty to ensure that a child does not cause
injuries to third parties, 67 and prisons and psychiatric institutions are
obliged to protect the public from escaped prisoners" and patients. 69 In
Wellesley Hospitalv. Lawson Laskin, C.J.C. stated:70
It was not doubted by counsel for the parties that at common law a
hospital, especially one providing treatment for mentally ill persons, would
be under common law liability if by reason of its failure to provide
adequate control and supervision injury occurred to third persons by
reason of the conduct or behaviour of a patient.

Finally, an affirmative obligation may also be imposed on one who has
71
control over a dangerous object.
(iii) Creationof Danger
Related to the idea that a duty will be imposed on one who has control
over an instrument of danger is the idea that a duty will be imposed on
one who non-negligently creates a danger. In Oke v. Weide Transport
and Carra72 the defendant non-negligently collided with a sign post,

61. Fleming, Law of Torts (1983) 142; Remedies in Torm supra n. 7 at 16.1-102.
62. Williams v. Eady (1893), 10 T.L.R. 41; Moddejonge v. Huron County Bd of Educ., [1972]
2 O.R. 437 (HC.J.); Portelancev. Bd of Trustees R.C. Sep. Sch. of Grantham, [ 1962] 2 O.R.
365,32 D.LR. (2d) 337 (CA.).
63. Fleming, Law of Torts, supra n. 61 at 142; Remedies in Tort, supran. 7 at 16.1-102.
64. Horsley v. McLaren supra n. 5.
65. Timm v. R. [1965] 1 Ex. C.R. 174; Ellis v. Home Office [1953] 2 All E.R. 149; Howley
v.R., [1973] F.C. 184.
66. Lawson v. Wellesley(1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 677; affd on other grounds, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 893.
67. Hatfield v. Pearson(1956), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 593; Starrv.Crone, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 433.
68. Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1140, [1970] 2 All
E.R. 294; affg. [1969] 2 Q.B. 412, [1969] 2 All E.R. 564.
69. Holgate v. LancashireMental Hosp. Bd, [1937] 4 All E.R. 19. In the United States the
duty is even broader. See Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Ca/if (1976), 131 Cal. Rptr. 14.
70. (1978), 76 D.L.R. (3d) 688, 691, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 893.
71. See eg. Stermer v. Lawson (1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 366; affd (1979), 11 C.C.L.T.
(B.C.C.A.) lending a motorcycle to a young, unlicensed driver; Rudolph, "The Duty to Act:
A Proposed Rule", supra n. 39 at 503; Ayers v. Hicks (1942), 40 N.E. 2d. 334.
72. (1963), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 53.
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leaving it bent and protruding from the pavement at right angles. The
deceased was later "speared" by the post when it penetrated the floor
boards of his car and deflected up into his chest. The majority of the
Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff's action on the grounds
of foreseeability, reserving judgment on the question of whether or not
the defendant was under a duty to the deceased to do anything about the
post.73 In a celebrated dissent Freedman, J.A., argued that the defendant
should be held liable. Unlike other motorists on the highway, Carra's
opportunity to observe the danger was more than fleeting. Indeed, he had
stopped to clear away some debris resulting from his own accident.
Further, he was responsible for the creation of the hazard which
eventually caused the death. The essence of Mr. Justice Freedman's
opinion is supported elsewhere, affirmative obligations being imposed in
various circumstances where a defendant's actions created a situation of
74
peril.
(iv)

Gratuitous Undertakings

This is a difficult area; difficult because the law is still in an unsettled
state, and difficult because it encompasses a number of related but distinct
issues. The matter can best be understood if approached in two stages.
The first is to ascertain when, if ever, a gratuitous undertaking can give
rise to an obligation to act. The second is to determine whether liability
does, and should, lie where a person abandons a gratuitously rendered
rescue effort mid-stream, leaving the victim undoubtedly disappointed,
but not detrimentally affected.
Generally, a mere promise, unsupported by consideration, will not
ground an action in either tort or contract. There is, however, an
underdeveloped body of law which suggests that where the undertaking
is coupled with reliance, a tortious duty may be imposed. In effect, a
party, through past conduct, may create a self-imposed obligation to act.
Such was the case in Mercer v. South Eastern and Chatham Railway
Co..75 The defendant there had voluntarily commenced a routine of
locking a gate which opened onto its railway fracks whenever a train

73. l d at 58.
74. Jordan House v. Menow, supra n. 48; Depeu v. Flatau(1907), 100 Minn. 299, 11 N.W
1 (ejecting an ill person into a wintry night); OntarioHospitalServices Commission v. Borsoski

(1973), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 339, 7 O.R. (2d) 83 (instructing an intoxicated person to drive an
automobile); Haynes v. Harwoo4 (1935] 1 K.B. 146, [1934] All E.R. Rep. 103 (leaving a
horse drawn van unattended in a crowded street). As seen from the last case the category of
"creation of danger" is not one which easily or necessarily can be made to parallel the category
of "misfeasance".
75. [1922] K.B. 549.
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passed by. The object of the practice was to prevent that which in fact
occurred. The plaintiff, aware of and relying on the defendant's custom,
was run down by a locomotive after passing through the unlocked gate.
Regrettably, through carelessness the defendant had deviated from its
76
usual procedure. Liability followed.
[T]o those who knew of the practice that was a "tacit invitation" to cross
the line.... It may seem a hardship on a railway company to hold them
responsible for the ommission to do something which they were under no
obligation to do, and which they did only for the protection of the public.
They ought, however, to have contemplated that if a self-imposed duty is
ordinarily performed, those who knew of it will draw an inference if on a
given occasion it is not performed. If they wish to protect themselves
against that inference being drawn they should do so by giving notice, and
they did not do so in this case.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada held the Crown partially
responsible for the damage occasioned when two ships met in the St.
Lawrence River. 77 A set of navigational lights gratuitously installed by
the Crown had drifted some 40 feet from its original, proper position, a
fact which contributed to the accident. A number of other decisions also
support the view that the combination of a gratuitous undertaking and
78
resulting reliance can lead to a duty to act.
The second issue to be addressed in regards to gratuitous undertakings
concerns the standard of care which will be imposed on one who
commences to effect a rescue in the absence of a duty to do so.79 On the
one hand, the famous American case of Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros.80 stands
for the proposition that one who gratuitously undertakes a rescue must
not fail to do what "an ordinary man would do in performing the task".
A different approach was adopted in East Suffolk Catchment Board v.
Kent 8' where it was held that a public body would not be liable for
76. Id at 554. In an earlier Canadian case, a contrary decision was reached on very similar
facts. Soulsby v. City of Toronto supra n. 43. Recent decisions greatly undermine its authority.
77. The Queen v. Nord-Deutsche Versicherungs-Gelleschaft [1971] S.C.R. 849, 20 D.L.R.
(3d) 444 but see Cleveland Cliffs S.S.Co. v. R, [1957] S.C.R. 810, 10 D.L.R. (2d) 673, 76
C.RT.C. 14.
78. See e.g. Grossman and Sun v. The King [1952] 1 S.C.R. 571, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 241;
Hendricks v. The Queen, [19701 S.C.R. 237; County of Parklandv. Stetar, (1975] 2 S.C.R.
884.
79. Temporally, this issue finds its origins on the other side of the onset of the "victim's" plight.
The questions here deal not with the events leading up to the need for assistance, but with
events occuring after that time.
80. (1935), 287 N.Y.S. 134; affd without reasons(1935), 287 N.Y.S. 136.
81. [1941] A.C. 74, [1940] 4 All E.R. 527. The case has been much criticized, and subsequent
decisions have put its status into doubt. City of Kamloops v. Nielsen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, 29
C.C.L.T. 97, [1984] 5 W.W.R.I, (per Wilson J.); Anns v. Merton London Borough Counci
[1978] A.C. 728, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024, [1977] 2 All E.R. 492.
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failing to expediently continue on with a rescue operation unless by doing
so it inflicted injury on the plaintiff. The Ontario Court of Appeal
subsequently expanded that principle to cover private individuals who
gratuitously intervene. In Horsley v. McLaren 2 Mr. Justice Jessup,
basing his comments on Ken4 stated that "where a person ...
without
any duty to do so undertakes to... go to the aid of another, he incurs no
liability unless what he does worsens the condition of the other."83 Of
course, it is arguable that the mere fact of commencing, then abandoning,
an effort may in some instances have a detrimental effect. Other potential
rescuers may pass by, confident that the situation is in hand. More
dramatically, a drowning man, seeing help apparently approaching, may
release a flotation device which he is desparately clinging to for life in
order to expend his last precious ounces of energy to thrash towards his
saviour. Often, however, a change of heart by the rescuer will leave a
rescuee in no worse a position.
The position taken by the Court of Appeal in Horsley, while perhaps
evincing an un-neighbourly attitude on its face, on further analysis reveals
yet another instance of legal encouragement of Good Samaritans. The
strict requirement of Zelenko has been said to underlie the refusal of
many American doctors to become involved at accident scenes. 84 (Better
to not act at all than to get in over one's head only to have a court later
condemn one's efforts as insufficient.) On the other hand, the rule that
liability will lie only if the rescuer's conduct has detrimentally affected the
rescuee's status quo is intended, on policy grounds, to foster rescues by
limiting the possibility of liability for unsuccessful undertakings. If it were
otherwise, potential Samaritans might be discouraged where they could
not at the outset confidently judge what exactly would be required and
whether they would be up to such a task. The down side of such a rule,
of course, is that it also can be used in defence of callousness.85
Obviously, the position taken in this paper is that such a rule, while
praiseworthy in its object, provides an incomplete and unsatisfactory call
for succour. It would be better to require assistance, but to also treat
rescuers generously by recognizing generally the type of protection
afforded doctors under Good Samaritan statutes.8 6 Liability for
82. [197012 O.R. 487.
83. Id at 500. Mr. Justice Schroeder echoed that view, id at 495. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court of Canada, on appeal, refrained from commenting on this matter.
84. Linden, "Rescuers and Good Samaritans" (1971), 10 Alta. L Rev. 89 at 91.
85. Presumably, all else being equal, a rescuer could swim a mile in rough seas to save a
drowning child, change his mind five yards from shore and allow the child to drown. The
rescuer would surely be ostracized, and it seems unlikely that a legal system which would
permit such conduct would be held in high public esteem.
86. See e.g. Emergency Medical Aid Act, supra n. 42.
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mishandled or aborted efforts should give rise to liability only where the
conduct amounted to "grossly" unacceptable or inappropriate behaviour.
"Damned foolish" behaviour, as opposed to mere "foolish" behaviour,
87
must never be countenanced.
(v) Statutory Duties
The exceptions canvassed to this point evince a recognition by the
judiciary that the imposition of a duty of affirmative action is, in many
instances, proper and necessary. There is also a body of law in which
Parliament and the provincial legislatures have played a role.
While much of the legislation imposing positive obligations is only
peripherally related to the issue of a duty to rescue (i.e. by requiring that
measures be taken to prevent perilous situations from arising), 88 "hit-andrun" statutes bear directly on the matter. Illustrative is the Alberta Motor
89
Vehicle Administration Act:
76(1) When an accident occurs on a highway, the driver or other person
in charge of the vehicle that was directly or indirectly involved in the
accident...
(b) shall render all reasonable assistance....
Failure to do so may result in a fine of $500 or imprisonment for a
term not exceeding six months.90 Significantly, the statute is also said to
ground a civil action if breached. 9' The provision is interesting for its
scope of applicability. The legislature felt that it was justifiable to impose
a duty although the only nexus between the parties is common
involvement in an accident. More to the point, one must render aid
regardless of fault, 92 and even through one's involvement in the accident
may only be "indirect". Undeniably praiseworthy in its aim, the statute
87. Judge Magruuer distinguished between "gross negligence" and "negligence" in this way.
"God-damned foolish" behaviour, or "recklessness", is, of course, right out of the question.
Despite criticism and derision (Baron Rolfe sarcastically described "gross negligence" as
ordinary negligence "with the addition of a vituperative epithet" Wilson v. Brett (1843), 11
M.&W 113, 152 E.R. 737.) the courts have managed to make sense of the distinction. Linden,
Canadian Tort Law, supra n. 7 at 153-155; Kingston v. Drennan (1897), 27 S.C.R. 46;
Cowper v. Studer,[1950] S.C.R. 450.
88. See e g. Commerfordv. Halifax School Commissioners, [1950] 2 D.L.R. 207 (N.S.) (snow
removal by-law).
89. Supra n. 6. See also Canadian Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.252(1); Highway
Traffic Act R.S.O. 1980, c. 198, s.174(1)(6); Motor Vehicle Act R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 288,
s.62(1).
90. R.S.A. 1980, c. M-22, s. 101(1).
91. Linden, CanadianTort Law (4th ed. 1988) 283.
92. There exists, independently of the statute, a duty to render aid where the driver was
tortiously responsible for the injury of the other. Racine v. CNR, [1923] 2 D.L.R. 572, [1923]
1 W.WR. 1439, 19 Alta. L.R. 529 (C.A.).
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is nevertheless somewhat illogical and arbitrary. Imagine a situation
where A, the injured party, was driving while intoxicated, at an excessive
speed, the wrong way down a one way street. B, unharmed in the
accident which inevitably occurred, was proceeding along the same street
in full compliance with the law and common sense. Moments after the
collision C, a physician, drove slowly past the mangled frames of A and
his car as they lay motionless in the street. It is not altogether logical that
as between two innocents (B and C) only he who was the victim of a
wrongdoer's actions should be obligated to give succour or face fines or
imprisonment. True, B would likely be easier to identify as a defendant
if legal proceedings did subsequently arise. Such administrative concerns
should not, however, dictate the existence or denial of a duty. Nor can it
be said that those involved in accidents are invariably better able to assess
the existence or extent of injuries which require attention. Indeed, in the
example above C would be more capable of making such decisions and
providing such aid as was needed. Obviously there will be situations
where it would be impractical and even dangerous for passing motorists
to stop and investigate. A busy freeway at rush hour on a Friday
afternoon might give rise to such situations. However, under the duty
proposed, one would not be required to do that which would endanger
lives. Liability should lie only where one passes by in circumstances in
which the reasonable man would have ascertained whether aid was
needed.
The policy of section 76(1) of the Alberta Motor Vehicle
Administration Act, and of similar legislation, is clear. Parliament and
provincial legislatures have indicated a new direction for the law by
getting involved in the business of encouraging, nay, requiring Good
Samaritanism. That is important. What is also important, unfortunately,
is that lawmakers in Canada are still bound to the past, imposing duties
to rescue only where some relationship, however tenuous, arbitrary and
haphazard, provides a comforting excuse for doing so.
A number of other statutes requiring action to be undertaken for the
protection or aid of others have been relied upon (in part, at least) to help
create duties in tort law. 93 For example, Mr. Justice Spence, of the
Supreme Court of Canada, concurred with the "forthright and
enlightened" reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal in O'Rourke v.
Schacht" in which the Ontario Police Act formed part of the basis of the
93. Mr. Justice Linden of the Ontario High Court of Justice has written extensively in this
area. See CanadianTort Law supra n. 89 at 285-303; "Rescuers and Good Samaritans", supra

n. 84 at 91-97; "Tort Liability for Criminal Nonfeasance" (1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 25 at
34-65.
94. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 53, 55 D.L.R. (3d) 96; affg. [1973] 1 O.R. 221, 30 D.L.R. (3d) 641.
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civil duty imposed upon police officers to warn motorists of dangerous
conditions on highways. Mr. Justice Laskin (as he then was) relied on the
legislative policy of the Canada Shipping Act as a "fortifying element in
the recognition of the [common law] duty" of ship masters to rescue
passengers who fall overboard. 95 The Act provides that ship masters who
fail to render assistance to anyone "found at sea and in danger of being
lost" can be liable for a fine.9 In Colonial Coach Ltd v. Bennett and
CPR97 the defendant railway company was required under the Railway
Act to erect a fence to prevent cattle from getting onto railway lands.98
The statute provided for civil liability for any loss occurring "on the
railway lands".99 The dispute arose after a cow had wandered off a
farmer's land, through a hole in the railway fence and onto a highway
where it was struck by the plaintiffs vehicle. Although the loss did not
occur on "railway lands", liability followed. The Ontario Court of
Appeal found a tortious duty, their discovery aided by the existence of
the Act's provisions. There are other examples. 100 However, it is
important to appreciate that the existence of a statutory duty is merely
one factor to be considered in the search for tort obligations. The latter
does not invariably follow from the former. 10'
However, even those statutory duties which do not translate into tort
obligations can be important insofar as they illustrate societal views. On
pain of fine or imprisonment, 0 2 section 3(1) of the Alberta Child Welfare
03
Act provides that:
Any person who has reasonable and probable grounds to believe and
believes that a child is in need of protective services shall forthwith report
the matter to a director.
Humanitarianism dictates that where children are involved relatively
little (a belief based on reasonable and probable grounds) is needed to
justify the possible incurrence of the ills so feared by those opposed to
affirmative duties. Canadians accept (and perhaps welcome) this type of
legislation, in part at least, because children are typically unable to help
95. Horsley v. McLaren, supra n. 5 at 22 D.L.R. (3d) 560.
96. R.S.C. 1970, c. S-9, s. 516(1).
97. (1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 396.
98. R.S.C. 1952, c. 234, s. 277.
99. Id at s. 392.
100. While it is not clear, Criminal Code provisions requiring certain individuals to provide
the necessaries of life to children may also ground a tort action. See e.g. Algiers v. Tracy
(1916), 30 D.L.R. 427; cf Childs v. Forfar (1921), 51 O.L.R. 210. Discussed in Linden,
Canadian Tort Law, supra n. 91 at 287-289.
101. See e-g. Commerford v. Halifax School Commission, supra n. 88; Bhadauria v. Seneca
College of AppliedArts & Tech. Bd Of Goy. (1981), 17 C.C.LT. 106, 37 N.R. 455 (S.C.C.).
102. R.S.A. 1980, c. C-8.1, s. 3(6).
103. Id
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themselves, and because of the moral repulsion felt towards those who
abuse and those who watch in silence. In this regard, an analogy between
child abuse situations and rescue situations seems sound. Regardless of
the victim's age, a refusal to render aid to one in need should and does
attract public censure.
Finally in the area of statutory duties, it should be noted that the
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms recognizes that "4
Every human being whose life is in peril has a right to assistance.
Every person must come to the aid of anyone whose life is in peril, either
personally or calling for aid, by giving him the necessary and immediate
physical assistance, unless it involves danger to himself or a third person,
or he has another valid reason.
Under the law of Quebec (but not under the laws of common law
provinces) harm caused by the breach of such a provision may render the
wrongdoer liable for a criminal offence, notwithstanding the fact that the
legislation is a provincial enactment. Thus, in R. v. Forder'°5 the
defendant was convicted of homicide on the basis of a failure to provide
necessaries to a dying common law spouse.
2. Summary of the Exceptions
A number of commentators have sought to distil from the various
exceptions a common basis upon which affirmative obligations are
imposed and can be rationalized. Most popular is the "benefit theory"
which holds that a duty will be placed upon one who has "voluntarily
brought himself into a certain relationship with others from which he
obtains or expects a benefit." 106 The element of gain purportedly provides
a justification for the exacting of a heavy burden,i07 as that burden is said
to be based on "a consideration moving to the obligor, though not
necessarily from the obligee." 10S It is suggested, however, that unless
stretched to an untenable extent, the existence of a benefit (actual or
potential) moving to obligor provides at best only a partial explanation.
The proposition that "the presence of the benefit [is] a common

104. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12, s. 2.
105. 17. Nov. 1980, File No. 500-01-050-805, Sup. Crt., Longueil, Que., discussed in Law
Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 46, Omissions, Negligence and Endangering
(1985)18.
106. McNeice & Thornton, "Affrmtive Duties in Tort", supra n. 14 at 1282-1283; Bohlen,
"The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability", supra n. 12 at 220.
107. McNeice & Thornton, id at 1283-1284; Harper, Torts (1933) 197.
108. Bohlen, "The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability", supra n. 12 at 220.
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influential factor in all the affirmative duty situations"' °9 is, quite simply,
not supported by the case law.
Admittedly the presence of a benefit, and in particular an economic
benefit, may lead to the imposition of a duty." 0 The case of common
carriers is one obvious example."' Part of a carrier's "price" exchanged
for the fare paid by his passengers is his obligation to protect them.
However, the mere fact that one derives an economic benefit does not
inevitably lead to the conclusion that a duty will be incurred, nor does the
incurrence of a duty necessarily depend on the presence of a benefit. Mr.
Justice Laskin (as he then was), while holding that a duty did exist on the
facts before the court in JordanHouse Ltd v. Menow, went on to say that
not every tavern-owner would be under a similar duty to all his
customers." 2 "A great deal turns on the knowledge of the operator (or his
employees) of the patron and his condition.... ,
The benefit analysis is most unacceptable in regards to parent-child
relationships. There is something very distasteful about a legal system
which would purportedly downplay altruistic behaviour within the
family unit, and seek rather to explain the duty owed by a mother or
father as the price to be paid for some benefit actually or potentially
moving to the parent. Fortunately, it seems unlikely that the obligations
imposed on a parent are founded upon such cynicism. The law simply
recognizes that it is just, right and proper for one to protect and aid his
or her child, and accordingly it has created a duty to do so. So, too, it
recognizes that a parent should take steps to ensure that his or her child
does not injure others; such a duty is similarly not explained by the
benefit theory.
Gratuitous undertakings by definition can not be explained by the
benefit principle, a fact which even the most forceful advocates of the
theory concede. 14 Other exceptions to the general rule are similarly
damning. What, for example, was the benefit to Mr. McLaren that would
explain the duty imposed on him as a boat operator with respect to his

109. McNeice & Thornton, "Affirmative Duties in Tort', supra n. 14 at 1286 (emphasis
added).
110. Osterlind v. Hill supra n. 2, seems on this basis to have been wrongly decided. The
defendant had rented a canoe to the deceased plaintiff who was drowned after the craft
overturned a short distance from the shore. The court held that the defendant could not be held
liable, though he had listened to the plaintiff's calls for help for half an hour without attempting
to help in any way, because no duty was owed.
111. See e.g. Horsley v. McLaren supra n. 5 at 22 D.L.R. (3d) 559; McNeice & Thornton,
"Affirmative Duties in Tort", supran. 14 at 1285.
112. Discussed supra at n. 48.
113. Supra at n. 48 at 38 D.L.R. (3d) 113.
114. McNeice & Thornton, "Affirmative Duties in Tort", supra n. 14 at 1286-1287.
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gratuitous passengers in the famous Ogopogo Case?"5 Mr. Justice Laskin
(as he then was) expressly noted that the duty "did not depend on the
existence of a contract of carriage, nor on whether he was a common
carrier or a private carrier of passengers."' " 16 It seems clear, then, from all
that has been said, that the presence of a benefit does not provide the
unifying, underlying rationale for obligations of affirmative action
(though it may be a factor). Any why should it? The imposition of tort
duties in other areas is not dependant upon a benefit moving to the
obligor.
Other theories as to why or when tort law will impose a duty to act
are similarly unsatisfying. Professor Weinrib, starting from the
proposition that "[the] common law position on nonfeasance generally
relies on contract law, and hence on the market, to regulate the provision
of aid to others for independently existing dangers", 1 7 goes on to argue
that an affirmative obligation will be imposed in tort where there is an
absence of any social value in the liberty to contract. The evidence
offered in defence of this thesis, while somewhat supportive, is sparse and
ultimately unpersuasive. Weinrib begins by offering an explanation for
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in O'Rourke v. Schacht"8
in which a police officer was held to be under a duty to warn drivers of
dangerous conditions on a highway. 19
The court's holding required a policeman to confer a benefit on other
drivers without permitting him to bargain for compensation. Because
society's interest in upholding freedom to contract, if present at all, is very
attenuated, however, this coercion and concomitant deprivation of the
opportunity to contract are not serious. The transaction costs of
negotiating with successive drivers are so high, and the form of negotiation
is so unmanageable, that contracting would be highly inefficient if not
completely infeasible. More importantly, a policeman's contract to sell
information about road conditions would be undesirable and perhaps
unenforceable. The police officer is already under a public duty. (footnotes
omitted)
Similarly, duties owed by family members to one another are explained
on the basis that "family relations [are] never appropriate for market
regulation.' 120 Finally it is noted that contracts which have been made

115. Horsley v. McLaren, supra n. 5, discussed at n. 46.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id at 22 D.L.R. (3d) 559.
Weinrib, "The Case for a Duty to Rescue" (1980), 90 Yale L.J. 247 at 269.
Supra n. 94.
Weinrib, "Duty to Rescue", supra n. 117 at 269.
Id at 271.
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between rescuers and rescuees have been declared unenforceable as
unconscionable or made under duress."'
The theory is fatally flawed. First of all, it is rather limited in scope.
Weinrib does not, for example, even attempt to explain the basis of the
duty found in cases like Jordan House Ltd v. Menow: 22 There is no
compelling reason why the social values in the liberty to contract could
not be served in such situations. It would not be improper or
unmanageable for a tavern owner, perhaps in co-operation with a taxi
cab company, to arrange safe passage home for its patrons in exchange
for a small fee. Secondly, the case law offered in support of the argument
is not strong. The question of police officers contracting with citizens
received no mention in O'Rourke v. Schacht. Most of the family cases
cited are similarly flawed. 123 Balfour v. Balfour,t24 which does deal with
the enforceability of contracts between family members, is of no help.
The English Court of Appeal merely held that some mutual promises
between spouses cannot give rise to a cause of action in contract. Weinrib
fails to show that there is a necessary connection between the absence or
lack of contracts in some relationships and the imposition of a duty.
Finally, the emphasis on contractual matters needlessly complicates and
misleads. There exist other, more plausible, explanations for the duties
imposed on police officers and parents.
On a more fundamental level it appears that whether or not a duty will
be imposed is a policy decision. Neither the benefit theory nor Weinrib's
theory are capable of adequately explaining all of the affirmative
obligations which exist in tort law, though both may represent factors
which, along with others, are at play in the policy field. In some cases the
fact that one stands to derive a benefit provides a comforting (and
somewhat logical) basis upon which courts can justify a departure from
the general rule. Similarly, the fact that certain situations or relationships
do not permit aid to be bargained for may tend to counter-balance
somewhat the reluctance to coerce action. It is argued here, however, that
the time has come to drop hollow pretences, look beyond ex postfacto
rationalizations, and squarely address the question of whether on policy
grounds a general duty to aid one in peril should exist.

121. Id at 271. The discussion centres on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Post v. Jones (1857), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 150. A contract had been imposed by rescuers on
whalers who had been marooned in the Arctic.
122. Discussed supra at n. 48.

123. People v. Beardsley (1907), 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128; Territoryv. Manton (1888),
8 Mont. 95, 19 P. 387; R. v. Russell [1933] Vict. 59; Sommers v. Putnam Bd of Educ. (1925),
113 Ohio St. 177, 148 N.E. 682.
124. [1919] 2 K.B. 571.
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V. Policy Basisof Tort Development
A duty to rescue could be either judicially or statutorily created.
Although both approaches have features which recommend them, it is
the former which is preferred here. On a practical level it seems more
likely that the matter would come before a court rather than a legislature.
While both are under the strain of a heavy workload, a court can on any
given day be confronted with any given issue. On the other hand, the
agenda of the legislatures is more structured, and unless events were to
create an urgent demand, it seems relatively less probable that time
would be devoted to debating the merits and demerits of a general duty
to rescue. Admittedly, the judicial imposition of such a duty would be
dependant upon an intrepid bench, but the history and progress of the
common law has been authored not by "timorous souls", but rather by
"bold spirits". Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson 25 provides a
particularly fit illustration for present purposes, paving the way, as he did,
for a conceptual framework of negligence law based not on various and
26
disparate "exceptions", but rather on a single, general principle.1
Further, a judicially created duty would have one notable advantage.
Creative interpretation of legislation can be pushed only so far, and
therefore, once enacted, a statute would more or less stand frozen in time.
It would be preferable not to chance having the law strait jacketed by
legislative draftsmen. In contrast, a hallmark of the common law is its
flexibility, the ability to not only "adapt old conceptions to new facts, but
to absorb and apply what is settled and permanent in economics and
ethics."'127 The recognition by Canadian courts of affirmative obligations
in ever more circumstances illustrates this point.
A general duty to rescue, if it is to be recognized judicially, rather than
statutorily, will find its home in the tort of negligence. That it could fit
within the test set forth by Lord Atkin's famous dictum in Donoghue v.
128
Stevenson seems clear.
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law that you are
not to injure your neighbour, and the lawyer's question is, Who is my

125. [1932] A.C. 562, 101 L.J.P.C. 119,147 L.T. 281.
126. That is, just as the principle in Winterbottom v. Wright (1842), 10 M.&W. 109, 152 E.R.
402, 11 U. Ex. 415 was done away with, it is hoped that so too the days of liability for a
refusal to rescue being available only in "exceptional" circumstances will become a thing of the
past.
127. Bohlen, "The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability", supra n. 12 at 336.
128. [1932] A.C. 562, 580. Similar statements appeared in earlier decisions, but it is Lord
Atkin's which has withstood the test of time. Heaven v. Pender (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 503 as
limited by LaLievre v. Goulg [1893] 1 Q.B. 491; Buckley v. Mott (1920), 50 D.L.R. 508
(N.S.)
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neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to
avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely
to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer
seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act
that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected
when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in
question. (emphasis added)
While the "neighbour principle" is clearly only a "road sign" 129 and can
not be treated as a statutory test,130 high authority suggests that it is the
general rule and not the exception. In Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd v. Home
Office Lord Reid recognized that "[ilt will require qualification in new
circumstances", but felt that the time had come to apply it "unless there
is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion."' 31 Further,
though it is clear that a duty to rescue would be a remarkable step
forward, there is ample precedent for applying Lord Reid's view to
instances of nonfeasance generally. Lord Wilberforce, in Anns v. Merton
London Borough Counci echoed Lord Reid's thoughts in articulating a
two part test for the imposition of a duty. 32 He did so without
distinguishing between disputes arising out of acts and those arising out
of omissions, as in the case before him. For him, a prima facie duty would
arise where the parties stood in such proximity to each other that the
defendant, had he reasonably contemplated the consequences of his
conduct, would have realized that carelessness on his part would be likely
to result in damage to the plaintiff. That being so it would then be
necessary to "consider whether there are any considerations which ought
,,133 The
to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty ....
relevant question then becomes: what considerations should be
accounted for?
129. Fleming, The Law of Torts (1977) 136.
130. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd v. Home Office, [1970] 2 All E.R. 294 at 297 (per Lord Reid).

131. Id
132. [1977] 2 All E.R. 492. Despite those decisions, some feel that the neighbour principle is
inapplicable to nonfeasance cases. See e.g. Smith and Bums, "Donoghue v. Stevenson - The
Not So Golden Anniversary" (1983), 46 Mod L Rev. 147.
The test articulated by Lord Wilberforce has been accepted into Canadian tort law by the
Supreme Court of Canada in City of Kamloops v. Nielsen, supra n. 81. Mr. Justice Estey also
accepted and applied the test in B.D.C.Ltd v. Hofstrand FarmsLtd, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 223, 26

D.L.R. (4th) 1.
133. Id at [1977] 2 All E.R. 498. Very recent cases indicate that Anns v. Merton London
Borough Council may stand as the high-water mark in the growth and expansion of the duty
concept. Lord Keith of Kinkel, speaking for the House of Lords in Governors of the Peabody
Donation Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd, [1985] A.C. 210 at 240 warned against
construing the words of Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce too broadly, stressing the obvious,
fundamental fact that "... [the] true question in each case is whether the particular defendant
owed to the particular plaintiff a duty of care having the scope which is contended for.... His
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These considerations obviously include foresight of risk. 134 Also, the
House of Lords recently stressed that no duty should be imposed where
it would not be "just and reasonable" to do so. 1 35 Lord Denning held,
136
however, that "at bottom" the question of duty is:
...
a matter of public policy which we, as judges, must resolve. This talk
of "duty" or "no duty" is simply a way of limiting the range of liability for
negligence.
Mr. Justice V.C. MacDonald was equally candid in recognizing the true
use of the duty concept.
[There is always a large element of judicial policy and social expediency
involved in the determination of the duty37 problem, however it may be
obscured by use of the traditional formulae.1
Finally, Lord Wilberforce in McLoughlin v. O'Brian stated simply that in
regard to the imposition of a duty, "[we] must then consider the policy
arguments". 38 Thus, despite the reluctance of the reactionary few who
disagree,1 39 it appears clear that policy considerations do underlie courts'
decisions as to when a duty will be imposed. 140 As Prosser has noted, the
duty concept is "a shorthand statement of conclusion, rather than an aid

Lordship then cited with approval the dictum of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Dorset Yacht
Co. Ltd v. Home Office (supra, n. 130 at 1038) and emphasized that an important
consideration is whether it would be "just and reasonable" to impose a duty. See also Curran
v. NorthernIrelandCo-ownership HousingAssm Ltd, [1987] 2 All E.R. 13.
If the expansion days of the duty concept are indeed over, or at least on the wane, then
policy considerations stand to take on added importance. It is, however, as yet not clear how,
or if, these recent English decisions will impact on Canadian law.
134. "English law does not recognize a duty in the air....Bottomley v. Bannister,[1932] 1
K.B. 458 at 476 (perGreer L.J.). A duty is owed only to one who is within a foreseeable range
of injury. "If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act... [does] not take
to itself the quality of a tort ....Pasgrafv.Long IslandR.R. (1928), 162 N.E. 99 at 107 (per
Cardozo J.).
135. Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd, supra
n. 133.
136. Dorset Yacht Co. v.Home Office, [1969] 2 All E.R. 564 at 567 (C.A.).
137. Nova Mink v. Trans-CanadaAirlines,[1951] 2 D.L.R. 241 at 254 (N.S.C.A.).
138. [1982] 2 All E.R. 298 at 303.
139. See eg. idat 310-311 (per Lord Scarman); Rootes v. Shelton (1967), 16 C.L.R. 383 (per
Kitto J.) (Austr. H.C.). In Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home ffic
e [1970] 2 All E.R. 294 at 308,
Lord Morris decried the invocation of policy, stating that the imposition of a duty depends on
what is "fair and reasonable". It is not clear if or how considerations of what is "fair and
reasonable" differ from policy considerations.
140. See also Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v. Heller & PartnersLtd, [1964] A.C. 465, [1963] 3
WL.R. 101, [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 at 615 (perLord Pearce); Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A.C.
191; Demarco v. Ungaro (1979), 21 O.R. (2d) 673, 8 C.C.L.T 207, 95 D.L.R. (3d) 385
(C.A.); O'Rourke v. Schach4 supra n. 92 at 55 D.L.R. (3d) 114 (per Spence J.); Symmons,
"The Duty of Care in Negligence: Recently Expressed Policy Elements" (1971), 34 Mod L
Rev. 394 and 528.
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to analysis in itself", 141 a device used to limit or expand the scope of
liability on the basis of various non-justiciable sounding factors.
The specific considerations to be examined under the general rubric of
"policy" will vary somewhat from case to case. Clearly the courts 142 are
involved in an "assessment of the demands of society for protection from
carelessness of others", 43 but they will also enquire into various
administrative difficulties that may follow upon the imposition of a duty.
For example, would it lead to a "flood" of litigation? Care must be taken
to ensure that the duty imposed not be cast too high, placing an
unreasonable burden on the defendant. In altering or developing the law,
societal morals and values must also be accounted for if the new demands
are not to run counter to public sentiment. 144 So, too, the furtherance of
the goals of tort law may be considered. Deterrence of, and compensation
for, wrongful conduct are obvious examples, but the imposition of a duty
may also serve other, less familiar ends. It may help fill the very real
psychological void felt by victims when perceived wrongdoers cannot be
reached through legal processes. It is to a consideration of these and other
factors which the remainder of the discussion will be directed.
VI. Policy Considerations
1. Policy Arguments Against a Duty to Rescue
Reflecting the values and attitudes of the times, the development of the
early common law was premised upon a philosophy of "rugged
individualism".

45

Self direction or personal autonomy is a mark of the English race. The
Englishman, as opposed to one of Latin lineage, does not so easily coalesce
with the mass. He distinctly wishes to live his own life, make his own
contacts, or as he frequently says, "muddle through" in his own way.
Each man was to be regarded as self-reliant; able to care for himself and
willing to stand alone against any hardships which befell him. Even
hardships resulting from, or exacerbated by, this very same spirit of
individualism were accepted as the price to be paid for the concomitant
sense of dignity and self-respect. Quite naturally it was considered
141. Prosser, Handbookon the Law of Torts (1971) 325.

142. The same policy considerations would be examined if the matter came to be dealt with
by the legislatures.
143. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & PartnersLtd., supra n. 140 at 615 (per Lord Pearce).
144. "Though it is impossible to condense [the factors which are relevant to policy discussions]
into a definition ...it must be accepted, I think, that powerful among them is the social
outlook and the development of the country at the time when the court acts." McCarthy v.
Wellington City, [1966] N.Z.L.R. 481 at 519 (perMcCarthy J.).
145. Hope, "Officiousness" (1929), 15 CornellLQ.25,29.
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inappropriate for the government or the courts to intervene in regards to
omissions - their function was more narrowly aimed at preventing
positive harm from being done. 46 Indeed, to have regarded the
Englishman as requiring or being desirous of the coerced assistance of his
fellow countryman would surely have amounted to an affront to the
popularly held self image of the English race. The rise of capitalism and
perceived desirability of encouraging industrial expansion in later periods
undoubtedly reinforced the law's view that individualism should be
countenanced. The imposition of affirmative obligations to assist others
would have run counter to the push for materialistic progress.
Times have changed. Canadians of today are not embarrassed or
reluctant to call for or give help. That this is true is evidenced in the
attitudes found running through Canadian society. On a very broad level,
the entire social welfare system, embodying as it does health care, pension
plans and the like, is strikingly illustrative of the modem ethos. Wartime
conscription, of course, potentially entails sacrificing one's life for the
good of others. As has been shown, the newer spirit has been manifested
many times over in both judicial and legislative recognition of the
desirability of requiring succour. Importantly, it is not only at the
institutional level that one finds a changed perspective. Citizens of bygone
eras may well have looked askance at those who appealed for help in
their time of need, and lauded as courageous and proudly independent
those who suffered in silence. Such harsh judgements are today unlikely.
Condemnation is unlikely to follow upon a cry for help if the situation
was truly one of imminent danger. Indeed, silence in such circumstances
might be regarded as obstinate and irresponsible. From all that has been
said, it seems clear that modem Canadian society is not based on a
philosophy of rugged individualism.1 47 The view that a duty to rescue is
unnecessary and undesirable, so typical of the earlier era, should similarly
seem anachronistic.
Conception of an isolated individual whose obligations are few compared
to his possible range of activity deviates from the facts of present-day
society. A greater amount of group dependency on the part of each
individual as well as a steady increase in the number of affirmative duties
established by statute is discernible everywhere. The problem of finding
sufficient legal basis for affirmative duties has become less acute than it
was under an individualistic form of society. 4a

146. Hale, "Prima Facie Torts, Combination and Non-feasance" (1946), 46 CoL L Rev. 196,
214.
147. Crockerv. Sundance Northwest ResortsLtd., supra n. 52 at 1193.
148. Kirchheimer, "Criminal Omissions" (1942), 55 Harv.L Rev. 641.
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Implicit throughout the discussion so far has been the assumption that
a general duty to rescue would be consistent with commonly held notions
of morality. The time has come to support this view. Of course, it would
probably be adequate to simply state that most Canadians would
intuitively impute moral blame to one who refused to undertake a rescue
which could have safely be performed. 149 Beyond that, however, there is
strong basis for equating the two. The Biblical parable of the Good
Samaritan is well known. Jesus was asked by a teacher of law what must
be done to inherit eternal life.' 50 He replied "Love your neighbour as
yourself" and explained:
"A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, when he fell into the
hands of robbers. They stripped him of his clothes, beat him and went
away, leaving him half dead. A priest happened to be going down the
same road, and when he saw the man, he passed on the other side. So too,
a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by the other side.
But a Samaritan, as he traveled, came where the man was; and when he
saw him, he took pity on him. He went to him and bandaged his wounds,
pouring oil and wine. Then he put the man on his own donkey, took him
"
to an inn and took care of him.. ..
"Which of these three do you think was a neighbour of the man who fell
into the hands of robbers?"
The expert in law replied, "The one who had mercy on him."
Jesus told him, "Go and do likewise."
The law and Christian beliefs have always been inextricably linked to
some extent. In 1828 Chief Justice Best asserted that
... there is no act which Christianity forbids, that the law will not reach:
if it were otherwise, Christianity would not be, as it has always been held
to be, part of the law of England.15 1
That statement, at least by modern standards, goes too far. More accurate
today is the view of Lord Atkin. While he felt that "law has always
necessarily ingrained in it moral teaching", he also recognized that "law
and morality do not cover identical fields" 15 2 and accordingly based his
conception of a neighbourly duty on narrower grounds than that which
Christian morality would have dictated. 15 3 Nevertheless, it is clear that a
149. Dismissing the views of Ulpian and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Professor Tunc denies that
intuition or instinct can be "relied upon as a source of universally accepted rules of moral law."
"Tort Law and the Moral Law" (1972), 30 A.C.LJ. 247,248.
150. Luke 10:25. For similar teachings, see Genesis 4:9 and Matthew 25:4 1.
151. Bird v. Holbrook(1828), 4 Bing. 628, 130 E.R. 911.
152. (1932), Journalof the Society of Public Teachers of Law 30.
153. Donoghue v. Stevenson supra n. 125 at 580. Surprisingly, some take an opposing view.
Professor Smith and Professor Bums speak of the "autonomy of the law as a separate social
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duty to rescue, ifit was imposed, would be consistent with public
morality insofar as Christian values are still accepted by the masses.'14
The best indicator that a duty to rescue would be consistent with
morality or conscience, however, is seen in the possible responses to a call
for help. Basically, two are possible. First of all, the bystander may
become involved and personally provide relief or summon one who is
better equipped to do the job. Morality would surely underlie the
altruistic response. Alternatively, the bystander may pass by as the Levite
and the priest did. If, as in most cases, the bystander later tried to justify
his inaction, the role of morality is again evident. "I'm not a doctor - I
couldn't have helped." "Someone else will stop for the poor guy." "It's
none of my business." Such responses are unfortunately familiar to all but
the most saintly among us. What is clear is that if not for the pangs of
guilt, if not for the need to placate one's brothersome conscience, if not
for the knowledge that the morally correct choice was not made, such
rationalizations would be pointless and would not occur.
Epstein has argued that in a society in which the government can force
one to gratuitously confer a benefit upon another, "it becomes impossible
to tell where liberty ends and obligation begins". 5 While this may
overstate the matter somewhat, the undeniable fact is that the imposition
of a general duty to rescue would detract from personal freedom. The
question to be asked is whether, given the nature of Canadian society and
the expectations of Canadian citizens, this infringement would be
intolerable. The answer should be in the negative. The security, comfort
and sense of well-being one derives from life in a humane and civilized
community are acquired at a cost, and part of that cost is the sacrifice of
some measure of personal freedom. In many ways, Canadian society is
founded on, and held together by, compromise and concession. Various
positive obligations create and re-enforce the values and expectations
held by its citizens; it is tacitly assumed that one can be assured of not
having to "go it alone". Of course, when one receives, one must give as
well. True, if Canadian society is to retain its basic nature, liberty must at
some point prevail over the call for personal sacrifice. However,
practically speaking, the duty advocated would seldomly be invoked, and
when it was, it would only require action which would not expose the
institution, independent of morality" as being a "hallmark of English jurisprudence".
"Donoghue v. Stevenson - The Not So Golden Anniversary" supra n. 132 at 163. It is
difficult to know what to make of such a statement.
154. The 1981 Canadian census revealed that out of a total population of 24,083,495, some
21,678,745 were Christians. Presumably, those who consider themselves to be Christians hold
Christian values.
155. Epstein, "A Theory of Strict Liability" (1973),2 J. Legal Stud 151 at 199.
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rescuer to danger. The extent to which freedom would be threatened
would not be great.
Significantly, even John Stuart Mill conceded the desirability of a duty
to assist. Mill advocated extreme libertarianism as a means of achieving
a healthy and progressive society, and denounced government
interference and restraints on freedom. Still, upon estimating the long
term consequences of allowing one to stand idle while another cried for
1 56
help, he stated that:
There are many positive acts for the benefit of others which... [a person]
may rightfully be compelled to perform such as... to perform certain acts
of personal beneficence, such as saving a fellow creature's life.... A
person may cause evil to others not only by his action - but by his
inaction, and in either case he isjustly accountable to them for injury.
Other libertarians have similarly shied away from extremism and have
recognized the need to impose some restriction on the scope of freedom
available to each citizen. Bentham posed the question: 157
In cases where the person is in danger, why should it not be made the duty
of every man to save another from mischief, when it can be done without
prejudicing himself...?
For Bentham there could be no response.
It has been suggested that the imposition of a duty to rescue would
have an insidious effect on society insofar as it would establish "an
exalted form of socialism."'' 8 Decades after the paronoiac days of the
Cold War such sentiments seem pathetically insecure. A duty has been
imposed by regimes from all points on the ideological spectrum, from
Nazi Germany to post-revolutionary Russia to Minnesota in the Reagan
era. There is nothing to suggest that an obligation to save those in peril
has ever resulted in a perceptible swing to the political left. Such a shift
certainly has not been consequent to Article 63 of the French Penal
Code.5 9 It is difficult, then, to accept that the foundations of Canadian
society are so fragile that they could be altered simply by pulling the law
into line with the prevailing societal attitudes. Indeed, given that
Canadian society has evolved towards collectivism and away from
individualism, it is not altogether clear that such a shift, even if it did
transpire, would be unwelcome.
In defence of the traditional common law view it has been said that the
law should not require one to jeopardize his pocket-book or safety in an
156.
157.
158.
159.

On Liberty (1947) 11.
An Introductionto the Principlesof MoralsandLegislation (1970) 292-293.
Minor, "Moral Obligations as a Basis of Liability" (1923), 9 Va L Rev. 421 at 422.
Note "The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study", supran. 9 at 642.
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attempt to save a person in peril. 16 This argument is no longer
supportable because recent developments have seen tort law soften its
attitude towards rescuers, and also because it assumes the imposition of
a duty in all cases. First, while the early common law did invoke the
concepts of volenti' 6t and causation 62 to deny the claims of rescuers who
are injured as a result of their efforts, jurists of the 20th century have
increasingly come to praise and encourage Good Samaritans.163
Consequently, compensation is available to the reasonable'" rescuer
from one who negligently created the perilous situation (be it either the
"victim" himself,165 or his tortfeasor' 66 ) or from a third party responsible
for supervening negligence.1 67 Going further, Canadian courts have also
permitted an intervener who intended to charge for his efforts to claim
remuneration for services he has rendered. The plaintiff in Matheson v.
Smiley, 6 1 a surgeon who tried but failed to revive a suicide, was
successful in his suit against the estate of the deceased. The policy behind
such decisions is clear. Cardozo once announced that "danger invites
rescue"; 169 it is increasingly clear that so, too, does the law. Further, not
only would a rescuer not have to pay for expenses associated with any
injuries sustained, he would also not be required to underwrite general
charitable efforts. It has been suggested that once begun, the imposition
of a duty to rescue could not logically be stopped short of requiring
perfect altruism, the wealthy being obliged to donate money in order to
further the alleviation of hardship. 70 Lawyers and judges, however, are
professional line-drawers. The meaning attributed to "rescue" for the

160. McNeice & Thornton, "Affirmative Duties in Tort", supra n. 14 at 1288; Linden, "Tort
Liability for Criminal Nonfeasance", supra n. 93 at 30.
161. See e-g. Kimball v. BuderBro, supra n. 40.
162. See e-g. Anderson v. NorthernRy. Co., supra n. 40.
163. See e.g. Attorney Generalfor Ontario v. Crompton (1976), 1 C.C.L.T. 81. A detailed
analysis of the position in civil law countries can be found in Dawson, "Rewards for the
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purpose of the present discussion can and should exclude the notion of
"economic beneficence". 17 ' They are responses to clearly distinguishable
situations. In the former, the peril involves strong elements of immediacy
and urgency. The potential rescuer is the only one (or one of a relatively
small group) who could give the required aid in time. In the latter, the
call for help can be announced to the world at large. Charitable relief of
suffering is typically undertaken by established organizations or
governments, and is administered over a period of time. Further, if the
situations are not distinguished, the result would be not retributive justice
(which is the purpose of imposing a duty) but rather distributive justice.
An unfair, unreasonable and unrealistic burden would be thrust on
172
anyone with any wealth.
Secondly, while it is inevitable that mishaps would occur under the
proposed duty, a bystander need not court disaster in order to fulfil his
obligations. To reiterate, the model advocated, based on the French
experience, would only require that which could be done safely.
On a very practical level, one reason that common law courts initially
refused to entertain tort actions for nonfeasance was that they were
already overburdened with more pressing concerns. Priorities were
established, and in view of the abundance of cases involving active
misconduct, the courts understandably regarded the question of whether
a person should be liable for an omission as being too remote to warrant
attention. 73 Today, of course, the situation is different. While Canadian
courts are under considerable strain, they commonly do hear disputes
centred on nonfeasance. The relevant question now is whether the
imposition of a duty to rescue would intolerably exacerbate an already
difficult situation. That is, would there be an unmanageable "flood" of
litigation?
The experience under the French statute is encouraging for advocates
of general duty. Statistics indicate that while actions under 63§2 of the
Penal Code are of a sufficient number to generate public awareness and

171. As has been noted elsewhere, the proposed duty wouLd require that money be expended
in the very unlikely event that, first, only it could alleviate the danger and second, that there
is a defined and limited class of persons who could provide it.
Rudoph, "The Duty to Act A
Proposed Rule", supra n. 39 at 509-510. For a different analysis, but same conclusion, see
Weinrib "The Case for a Duty to Rescue", supra n. 117 at 272.
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Justice Edmund Davies in London Borough of Southwark v. Wifliams, [1971] 2 All E.R. 175
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deter wrongful conduct, they are not so common so as to swamp the legal
system. 174 Admittedly, such figures are dependant upon many variables.
Still, given that the population of Canada is about half that of France, it
seems unlikely that Canadian courts would be overloaded with
complaints of succour withheld. Canada simply is not that inhospitable a
place.
Finally, other administrative concerns can be considered under the
rubric of "policy". In light of the French experience these fears would
prove to be unfounded. For example, the argument that it would be too
difficult to properly identify defendants 175 is hardly convincing. Where
the pool of defendants is large (e.g. where thirty bystanders watch an
infant drown in a flooded ditch) the well-advised plaintiff would simply
sue every onlooker who could be identified. As in France, a duty should
be imposed on each of them.1 76 It is not open to a tortfeasor to excuse his
own conduct by pointing to the moral culpability of others. It would be
futile for him to complain, "why pick on me?". 177 On the other hand,
there will be many instances where there will be considerable difficulty
in finding even one person to sue. One who is responsible for an omission
does not as readily identify himself through his conduct as does one who
is responsible for an act. That, however, certainly does not persuasively
argue against the imposition of a duty. The policy of France's "rescue
law", or of child abuse reporting statutes in Canada, are well served
despite such administrative difficulties. It would be ridiculous to suggest
that the law should placidly resign itself to the fact that atrocities are
committed and throw its hands up in despair simply because the
perpetrators are not immediately identifiable.
2.

Policy Arguments in Favourof a Duty to Rescue

Most of what has been said up to this point has simply rebutted
arguments made against the imposition of a duty to rescue. That, of
course, only takes the issue half of the way home. It is necessary to show
not only that bad things would not come from a duty, but also that good
things would.
From a practical viewpoint, the best possible result which could come
from the imposition of a duty would be an increase in the number of
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rescues which are undertaken. A duty probably would not lead to an
increase in the number of people requiring rescue, 178 but it could lead to
an increase in the number of people performing rescues. While it is true
that any effect would be dependant on public awareness, it seems that the
masses are not as uninformed on legal matters as might be thought. As
the issues involved in rescue cases are applicable to everyone, easily
accessible and intrinsically interesting, a change to the traditional law is
likely to be widely reported by the media. Certainly the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in JordanHouse Ltd v. Menow 79 reached the
appropriate audience. A survey of tavern owners disclosed that over 70
percent had become aware of the court's holding through newspaper and
magazine articles.'80 Even where the media's influence is not so readily
apparent it appears that people are quite well informed. An international
survey conducted in 1965 asked citizens of West Germany (which had a
legal duty) and Austria and the United States (which did not) if they
thought there was a legal duty, as opposed to a mere moral duty, to be
a Good Samaritan.' 8' Between 74 percent and 86 percent gave the
correct answer.
Assuming that people would be aware of a duty to rescue if it existed,
the question then becomes whether they would more often aid those in
peril. Posner's suggestion that the existence of an obligation would
paradoxically lead to fewer rescuers is, in the absence of empirical
support, difficult to accept. 8 2 First, his prediction that (for example) a
strong swimmer would avoid the beach because there might be a call for
help is dubious to say the least. Given that the sacrifice required would
be minimal and non-life threatening, it seems unlikely that such a person
would shun the water and the pleasure that it brings her, as well as the
possibility of glory and personal pride which would follow upon a rescue.
Secondly, Posner's prediction that altruists, who would otherwise
become involved, would refuse on the grounds that a legal duty would be
coercive and would deprive them of the power of choice, is untenable. It
is certainly a cynical view, but beyond that it seems to fly in the face of
common sense. How likely is it that a person, otherwise predisposed to
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benevolent behaviour, would be so offended by legal recognition of his
own values that he would consciously commit a tort and incur liability
and public condemnation? Have Canadians stopped reporting child
abuse because of the statutory obligation placed upon them? Have they
fled from highway accident scenes for the same reason, although their
natural reaction would be to stay and give succour? Have the French
refused to rescue simply because article 63§2 exists? Admittedly such
matters are not easily given to empirical study, and opinions as to what
effect a duty would have cannot be conclusively shown to be true or false.
Still, it does seem far more probable that, if anything, a duty would lead
to more, not fewer, rescues.
On another level, the imposition of a general duty to rescue would
benefit not only those in peril, but the law as well. The law is vain and
self-interested; members of the legal profession take pains to ensure that
justice is done and that it is seen to be done. In denying the existence of
a duty the law is serving neither of those ends. The cost of such a course
183
was eloquently stated by Bohlen:
...
a system of law which lags too far behind the universally received
conceptions of abstract justice, in the end must lose the sympathy, the
confidence, perhaps even the respect of the community.
While recent years have seen an increasing number of exceptions being
made to the general rule, most circumstances will still not require action.
Isolated though they may be, incidents such as the one involving Kitty
Genovese, 184 lead to a hue and cry which cannot have anything other
than a detrimental effect on the law. Less dramatic but more common
incidents have the same invidious effect on a regular basis. The prognosis
for a legal system characterized by "dogma on the books... divorced
from morality"1 85 can not be a healthy one.
The imposition of a duty to rescue would also be a positive
development in that it would serve the various goals of tort law. It would
likely lessen the incidence of socially undesirable behaviour as it would
provide an incentive (the avoidance of liability) to those who are capable
of action and who are aware of the moral call for help, but who are
simply callous or recalcitrant. That is, it would act as a deterring factor.
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Similarly, the frequency with which succour is withheld would diminish
as tort law's function as an educator would be employed. To reiterate,
societal attitudes have undergone considerable change over the past
centuries. Unfortunately, there are always those who do not appreciate
the emergence (or even existence) of such changes. While they take the
advantages of living in a community which, based on a new ethos, cares
for them in their time of need, they fail to reciprocate in kind and satisfy
basic humanitarian expectations. For this group the imposition of a duty
would serve as a medium for the message, and as a manifestation of the
message itself.
Other goals of tort law would be served as well. Some are more
esoteric than others. The availability of a tort action would, for example,
satisfy an important psychological need by appeasing those aggrieved by
another's inaction. 8 6 On a less abstract level, tort law's compensatory
function would be served as those who sustain injury or further injury
could turn to their wrongdoers for reparation. Finally, tort law's justice
component would be furthered. The deceptively simple idea here is that
where one wrongfully injures another, one ought to make amends.
Personal responsibility for one's conduct is a notion which is first taught
to us as children, and which lies at the heart of the commonly held view
ofjustice.
VII. Conclusions
In the latter part of the twentieth century Canadian judges and legislators
have come to recognize a duty to rescue in an increasing number of
situations. It has been argued that at bottom such duties are rooted in
policy. The time has come to re-assess whether a more general duty
would, on policy grounds, be warranted and wise.
The denial of a general duty has its foundations in an era long since
1 87
past. The eloquence of Bohlen's explanation is incomparable.
[E]thical and moral conceptions, which are not the mere temporary
manifestation of a passing wave of sentimentalism or puritanism ...
find a
real and permanent place in the settled convictions of a race and.., of
necessity do in time color the judicial conception of legal obligation ....
[W]hat are now regarded as legal duties as distinguished from moral and
ethical duties, merely embody the crude conceptions on such points
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prevalent at the early stage of national civilization and social development
when the King's Court took over into its keeping, and undertook the task
of enforcing the common or customary law of England.
Still, the fact that the origins of an idea can be traced to antiquity does not
necessarily mean that it is an anachronism whose time for burial has
come. The ethical and moral conceptions of the present must be
examined before any such judgment can be pronounced. From all that
has been said, however, it appears abundantly clear that the view
embodied in the law's general denial of a duty to undertake a rescue is
an anachronism. Accordingly, the law should be altered so as to reflect
the settled convictions of Canadians today.
Admittedly, affecting such a change would not be easy. Developments
might continue to be slow and uncertain as judges and legislators
cautiously invoke various devices as means of justifying their progressive
steps. The affinity which the law has for "special relationships", for
example, may come to be even more pronounced. It is already seen in
statutes which require motorists to provide assistance after an accident
only if they were brought into association with the injured party through
common involvement in the accident.1 88 It is argued, however, that if
need be the term can be stretched to cover rescue situations. The
(increasingly) collective nature of Canadian society begets "special
relationships". Given the values and expectations of its citizens, it seems
reasonable to find one arising in circumstances where one has a unique
opportunity to save a fellow human being from death or serious physical
harm without incurring an element of personal risk. Whether the concept
of "special relationship" would be reaffirmed or repudiated by such a
broad definition is really irrelevant. The argument being made is that the
insistence on such rationalizing labels only tends to obscure the more
fundamental questions of whether or not a general duty to rescue should
be recognized.
The policy considerations which must be accounted for in answering
this question are many. On the basis of the experience in France over the
past four decades it has been shown that the administrative and
philosophical fears of those who oppose a duty are largely unfounded.
So, too, it has been shown that the existence of an obligation to assist
those in peril would have many positive effects. Prosser has said that
"changing social conditions lead constantly to the recognition of new
duties".,8 9 One can hope.

188. See also Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd., supra n. 52 at 1197; Hague v.
Billings (1989), 68 O.R. (2d) 321 at 336.
189. Handbook on the Law of Torts (1964) 334.

